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Public Pension Fund Investments . .-, 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- ' 
Official Title and Summary Prepared by the Attorney General 
PUBUC PENSION FUND INVESTMENTS. LEGISLATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT. Deletes consti-
tutional provisions specifying percentage and type of stocks and corporations in which public pension funds may invest. 
Substitutes provisions empowering Legislature to authorize investment of public pension funds by fiduciary who must 
discharge duties solely in interest and for exclusive purposes of providing benefits to participants and their beneficiar-
ies, minimizing employer contributions, and defraying reasonable administrative expenses; discharge duties pursuant 
to specified prudent person standard; and diversify investments pursuant to specified standard. Declares public pension 
funds assets are trust funds held for exclusive purpose of providing benefits and defraying reasonable administrative 
expenses. Summary of Legislative Analyst's estimate of net state and local government fiscal impact: This measure 
would have no direct fiscal effect on the state or local governments. The indirect fiscal effect of this measure would 
depend on the extent to which the rate of return on the investments of public retirement funds is higher or lower than 
what it would have been in the absence of the additional flexibility authorized by this measure. 
Final Vote Cast by the Legislature on ACA 16 (Proposition 21) 
Assembly: Ayes 71 
Noes 2 
Senate: Ayes 38 
Noes 0 
Analysis by the Legislative Analyst 
Background 
The State Constitution generally prohibits state and lo-
cal agencies from buying stock in corporations. The Con-
stitution, however, allows the Legislature to authorize 
public pension or retirement systems to buy stock in cor-
porations, sUbject to various restrictions. For instance, no 
retirement system may invest more than 25 percent of its 
assets in common stock or more than 5 percent of its assets 
in preferred stock. In addition, no system may invest more 
than 2 percent of its total assets in the common stock of 
anyone corporation or own more than 5 percent of any 
company's outstanding common stock shares. 
The Constitution also limits the types of stocks which 
may be held by the retirement systems. In general, to be 
eligible for purchase by a public retirement system: , 
• The stock must be registered on a national securities 
exchange; 
• The company must have total assets of at least' $100 
million; and 
• The company must meet a specified common stock 
dividend history. 
The Constitution does not specify that assets of a public 
pension or retirement system are trust funds held for 
specified purposes, and it does not provide for particular 
fiduciary responsibilities for trustees of such pension or 
retirement systems. Fiduciary responsibilities are the spe-
cial obligations which people in positions of trust have 
toward those whose interests are affected by their actions. 
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Proposal 
This measure would delete the specific constitutional 
restrictions and limitations on the purchase of corpor" ') 
stock by public retirement systems. Instead, it would aL . 
the Legislature to authorize any investment of a pubJic 
retirement system's funds, subject to specified standards 
of fiduciary responsibility. This measure also specifies that 
the assets of pubJic pension and retirement systems are 
trust funds and requires that these assets be held for speci-
fied purposes. 
The major public retirement systems that would be af-
fected by this amendment are: (1) the Public Employees' 
Retirement System, which covers state and many local 
government employees, (2) the State Teachers' Retire-
ment System, which covers public school teachers, and (3) 
systems established under the County Employees' Retire-
ment Law of 1937. These systems currently have assets 
totaling approximately $40 billion. 
Fiscal Effect 
This measure would have no direct fiscal effect on the 
state or local governments. The indirect fiscal effect of this 
measure would depend on the extent to which the rate of 
return on the investments of public retirement funds is 
higher or lower than what it would have been in the ab-
sence of the additional flexibility authorized by this meas-
ure. 
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Text of Proposed Law 
This amendment proposed by Assembly Constitutional 
tmendment 16 (Statutes of 1983, Resolution Chapter lOS) 
'essly amends the Constitution by amending a section 
L ~f; therefore, existing provisions proposed to be de-
leted are printed in !lNeetit ~ and new provisions 
proposed to be inserted or added are printed in italic type 
to indicate that they are new, 
PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE XVI, 
SECTION 17 
~ SEC 17, The StMe state shall not in any manner 
loan its credit. nor shall it subscribe to, or be interested in 
the stock of any company, association, or corporation, ex-
cept that the state and each political subdivision, district, 
municipality, and public agency thereof is hereby author-
ized to acquire and hold shares of the capital stock of any 
mutual water company or corporation when 8tIeft the 
stock is so acquired or held for the purpose of furnishing 
a supply of water for public, municipal or governmental 
purposes; and 5tIeit the holding of ~ the stock shall 
entitle !ItIeft the holder thereof to all of the rights, powers 
and privileges, and shall subject ~ the holder to the 
obligations and liabilities conferred or imposed by law 
upon other holders of stock in the mutual water company 
or corporation in which tttteft the stock is so held. 
Notwithstanding provisions to the contrary in this sec-
tion and Section 6 of Article XVI, the Legislature may 
authorize the investment of moneys of any public Dension 
or retirement ittfte; ftM M exeeee is ~epeeBt ~ ~ ~ 
jti !ItIeft tttM eetel'tftiftee eft ffte ~ ~ eMf itt ffte eemJ 
\z ~ M ~ ttIMi ftM fe exeeee ~ ~epeeBt ~ ~ 
itt ptefel'!'ee !feeit M ~ ~ ~ ee~epaaeB, ~pe"fr!eee. 
system, subject to all of the following: 
tt:- bttett !Iteett is peg'istepee eft Ii BaaeBat seettriae!l ~ 
eftltBge, 88 ~pe',oieee itt ffte "SeettPiaes &teftttBge Aef ~ 
~ 88 ftlBeBeee, ffttt tttteft pegistraaeB sftatt ftef ee ~ 
~ wttft pe~eet M tfte feHeJiittg ~ 
It =I=fte eelBfBeB !feeit ~ Ii M:ett wmeft is Ii memeep ~ 
ffte Feeepat De~esit tMtlPMlee Ce~epaaeft Mt4 ftes ~ 
fltt ~ pe~pe!lefttee e,. e~iml, s~ltlS, Mt4 tlftEli';iees 
~peftts, ei ftt ~ ~ fftiHieft eeHttrs ($69,QQQ,GGG), 
st =I=fte eelBfBeft !feeit ~ ftft lMtlPftftee eem~ftfty wmeft 
ftes ~ ~ pe~pesefttee e,. e~iml, s~eeiat s~ltlS 
t'ttBes; ftft8 tIBM8i~ee stlJ'!'ltlS, ~ ftt ~ ~ fftillieft ~ 
- ($69,QQQ,QQQ) , 
at A:fty ~pefeft'ee Medt; 
~ bttett ee~8P8aeft Me ~ ~ ~ ftt leest ette ftttflJ 
~ fftiHieB eeHttrs (SlQQ,QQQ,QQQ), 
e: Befttis ~ ~ ee~ep8aeft, if ~ Me etltstftftemg, 
~ fer. itt" esttfteftt tm8eP ffte lttw ge'/eJ'ftiftg tfte tft¥estI 
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tBeM ei tfte pearemeftt ~ ftftEl Htere Me fte 8!'t'ellPS ~ 
Eli"fr!sefte ~a)"ffteftts eft #S ~pefel'!'ee ~ 
&. Stteft ee~epaeeft ftes ~ Ii eesft Eli'Aeefte eft #s eemJ 
ffteB !tteett itt ftt leest 8 ei tfte -lQ yetM'!t fte1tt ~peeeEliflg tfte 
&Me ei m.'1estfBeftt, Mt4 tfte agg¥eg8te ftef eltPftiftgs 8¥ftilI 
tt9te fer Eli';ieeftSs eft tfte eeftlffieft steeit ~ ~ eep~epal 
fteft fer tfte wftete ~ Stteft ~ fttwe geett ~ M tfte 
1lfft8t1ftt ei tttteft Eli';ieeftes ~ ftftEl Stteft ee~ep8eeft ftes 
f'8lti ftft eftfltee eesft Eli"fr!eefte itt etteft ei tfte lest ~  
e: bttett ift" estfBeftt itt ~ ette e8m~!l!ty !ftftY !'let ~ 
eeee ~ ~epeeftt ei ffte eefftffteft ~ ~ etltst8:H8iftg, 
ftftEl 
f. ~ sHtgle eefftlfteft ~ ifl'/estfBeftt !ftftY exeeee t; 
~epeeftt ~ tfte ~ ~ ffte ittftft; ~ eft eest. 
?'JefwiMtstanemg ~pe .. oisiefts M tfte eefttt'1lPY itt fffls Beef 
fteft ftft8 Seeeeft ~ ei keele *¥*; tfte Legisi8ttiPe fftttY 
atithePi2e ffte ift'lesttfteftt ei m8fte)'S ~ ~ ~ ~ensi8ft 
6P pearemeftt ~ itt!feeit M ~ ~ Ii Eli,,.ePMee fftft.ftf 
agemeBt ifl'/esttfteftt eem~ftBy pegistepes tm8eP ffte !!fB,l 
YestfBeBt Cemf'8fty Aef ~ ~ ~ ftes Mtfti ~ et 
ftt leest ~ fBiHi8ft ~ ($69,QQQ,QQQ); ~pe"r!eee, 
ft8We'lep, ~ ffte ~ tlwestfBeftt itt tttteft ~ ftftEi 
~ tegethep wttft!feeits Mt4 ~ ~ ttH Mftep ~ 
P8eeBS !ftftY ftef exeees is ~epeeBt ~ ffte ~ ~ stteft 
tttM eetel"ftl:!ftee eft tfte ~ ~ ffte eMf ei ffte ~ M 
~ 
(a) The assets of a public pension or retirement system 
are trust funds and shall be held for the exclusive purposes 
of providing benefits to participants in the pension or 
retirement system and their beneficiaries and defraying 
reasonable expenses of administering the system. 
(b) The fiduciary of the public pension or retirement 
system shall discharge his or her duties with respect to the 
system solely in the interest of, and for the exclusive pur-
poses of prOviding benefits to, participants and their 
beneficiaries, minimizing employer contributions thereto, 
and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the 
system. 
(c) The fiduciary of the public pension or retirement 
system shall discharge his or her duties with respect to the 
system with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under 
the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent person 
acting in a like capacity and familiar with these matters 
would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like charac-
ter and with like aims. 
(d) The fiduciary of the public pension or retirement 
system shall diversify the investments of the system so as 
to minimize the risk of loss and to maximize the rate of 
return, unless under the circumstances it is clearly pru-
dent not to do so. 
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Argument in Favor of Proposition 21 
Proposition 21 was written to give public pension assets 
full constitutional protection as trust funds. It guarantees 
that neither the Governor nor future Legislatures will 
ever be able to use this money for other purposes. Proposi-
tion 21 also adopts federally tested investment safeguards 
to replace existing guidelines. The current provisions, de-
Signed in a different era, often defeat retiree interests 
today. In addition, these old guidelines senselessfy raise 
the cost of pension administration for all taxpayers. 
Existing law guides state pension investments by listing 
allowed investments and the limitations on each. 
While this approach has helped keep investment hold-
ings diversified, other needs equally essential to pension 
plan well-being have suffered because of these provisions. 
No one writing the old rules foresaw the recent major 
changes in the national financial markets: accelerated 
dereguiation, an expanding financial services industry, 
and many new, special-purpose investment instruments. 
Because of these changes, the old investment list no 
longer serves as an adequate guide to today's safe invest-
ment options. Instead, the list's restrictions now hinder 
similarly prudent investments which wouid benefit the 
long-term interests of the pension plan and its retirees. 
Proposition 21 corrects this unanticipated problem by 
making retiree and pension plan benefits the only proper 
investment criteria. It does this by replacing the old ap-
proach with tested investment decision rules which are 
modeled on the extensive federal government experience 
in this area. 
Specifically, Proposition 21: 
• Declares all assets of a public pension or retirement 
plan to be trust funds. It provides that, apart from 
reasonable administrative costs, the only purpose for 
which these trust assets can be used is the delivery of 
retirement benefits. 
• Enacts the sole and exclusive purpose rule which im-
poses on fund trustees the legal obligation to perform 
their duties solely in the interest of plan beneficiaries. 
• Makes trustees personally liable if they invest funds 
without exercising, as federal law requires, the degree 
of care expected of a prudent person, who is knowl-
edgeable in investment matters. 
• Retains the requirement that investments be diversi-
fied so as to minimize risk. Instead of using current 
law's category approach to diversification, Proposi-
tion 21 makes diversification choices subject to the 
prudent person/personal liability rule. 
These four elements have proven effectiveness. They 
. are the key parts of a federal law which safeguards the 
funds in over 600,000 private pension plans. 
By adopting these rules, Proposition 21 meets Califor-
nia's pressing need for investment guidelines which do not 
undermine retiree interests merely by the passage of time. 
This tested federal approach solves this problem be-
cause it places stringent controls, not on the available 
choices, but upon the persons and methods of choosing. 
This approach recognizes that, when the duty to choose ja-- \ 
linked to personal responsibility for the choice, the hig: / 
level of independent, professional judgment is exercisea. 
Proposition 21 gives Californians the benefit of this 
proven approach so that state pension fund managers can 
take the best tools of today and turn them to the advan-
tage of tomorrow's retirees. It deserves your support . 
LOUIS J. PAPAN 
Member of the Assembly, 19th District 
LARRY STIRLING 
Member of the Assembly, 77th District 
Rebuttal to Argument in Favor of Proposition 21 
Proponents of Proposition 21 advocate increased specu-
lation in the stock market to allow for a greater rate of 
return through so-called "innovative" investments. They 
fail to mention, however, that such speculation is accom-
panied by a high degree of risk and a greatly increased 
danger of financial loss. 
There is no such thing as a "guaranteed return" in stock 
market speculation. 
Our current policy of requiring that pension moneys be 
placed in stable, prudent investments is the best method 
of safeguarding the financial interests of our state's re-
tirees and the taxpaying public. Isn't it wiser to continue 
putting these moneys in prudent, safe investments rather 
than engage in a stock market gamble? 
The State Teachers' Retirement Board recently lost mil-
lions of dollars on a get-rich-quick oil investing scheme. 
Allowing further questionable investment strategies could 
well jeopardize the fiscal security of all public pension 
funds. And we all know who pays the bill for any losses 
incurred through poor investments-tbat's right-the tax-
payer! 
Let's not take chances with our public pension funds. 
VOTE NO on Proposition 21. 
PAT NOLAN 
Member of the Assembly, 41st District 
JAKE PETROSINO 
Member, Boud of AdministntiOn. Public Emplor-' j 
Retire1llt!nt System, Sate of CAJifomi. 
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Argument Against Proposition 21 
Proposition 21 allows investment in common stocks bv 
the state's public pension systems to jump from th~ 
present 25 percent of assets to as much as 100 percent of 
pension funds. 
A similar measure, Proposition 6, was rejected in 1982 
with 61 percent of the voters against it. That reflected a 
well-deserved negative response based upon a track 
record beginning in 1968 when the current 25-percent 
limit was established. 
Earnings from our pension systems' common stock in-
vestments have COnsistently failed to meet the modest 
earnings levels necessary to help fund California's public 
pension systems. Using any comparative criteria, the re-
turns on common stock investments made by the public 
pension systems have been dismal when compared to 
other types of investments by both public and private 
sector pension systems across the nation. The economic 
security of retirees is too important to be gambled away 
in the stock market. 
Assets of public pension funds should continue to be 
placed in mortgages and other more consistently profita-
ble types of investments to provide a prudent "mix" that 
safeguards the long-term financial needs of public pension 
")'stems. If approved, Proposition 21 could drastically 
- :e other types of investments. 
1: ublic Employees' Retirement System (PERS) earn-
ings from common stock have been less than 4 percent 
>_. - ually during the entire period that the system has been 
ll\-Uting in common stocks. Other types of investments 
have averaged in excess of 9 percent per year. The entire 
15-year PERS record stands as undeniable proof that an 
increase in common stock holdings to an unlimited per-
centage of pension fund assets is a serious mistake. In these 
difficult and uncertain economic times, we hardly need to 
permit a questionable fiscal practice. 
The trust fund language proposed in Proposition 21 al-
ready exists in current retirement law, yet public pension 
systems have been "creatively" raided by past Legisla-
tures and Governors. The simple fact is, there is no lan-
guage in the State Constitution which can effectively pro-
tect public pension funds from politically enacted 
thievery. 
The so-called "prudent" investment rules proposed by 
Proposition 21 allow a wider variety of "high-risk" invest-
ments. This is unwise for a pension fund which MUST 
minimize risk in order to preserve assets used to pay pen-
sions which are long-term, contractual obligations to the 
retirement system members. It would be better to retain 
conservative investment requirements for public pension 
systems of present law. 
The dismal record in stock market speculation stands as 
proof that there is no good reason to relax existing re-
straints on public pension fund investments. 
Approval of Proposition 21 will be a costly mistake for 
the public sector workforce and the California taxpayer. 
all of whom will be economically damaged by reduced 
retirement fund earnings in future years. 
Vote NO on Proposition 21. 
PAT NOLAN 
Member of the Assembly, 41st District 
JAKE PETROSINO 
Member, IJourJ of Administration. Public Employees' 
Retirement System, State of CIIliFomU 
Rebuttal to Argument Against Proposition 21 
Proposition 21 is as critical to taxpayers and retirees as 
any pension measure of the last 10 years-but all the oppo-
nents offer is rhetoric and wild claims. 
Proposition 21 is not a rerun of any ballot measure. 
While current law increases risk by forcing all pension 
moneys into a few investments, this measure adopts the 
proven, conservative federal approach which cuts risk by 
allowing greater variety if the dictates of prudent judg-
ment are met. 
And the charge that Proposition 21 will lead to 100% 
stock ownership is totally misleading. Total reliance on 
stocks would be legally impossible under Proposition 21 
for the very reason the opponents cite-it would be fool-
hardy and imprudent. 
The fact of Proposition 21 is that it will subject every .t ment decision to greater prudence, not less. 
Proposition 21 should be approved because, unlike the 
opponents, it is absolutely realistic about how prudent 
investments are made. 
The opponents talk lightly of "consistently profitable" 
investments. If such surefire formulas exiSt, why aren't we 
all millionaires? The fact is the only protection in any 
investment is the care and thought which go into it. That's 
why Proposition 21 places this requirement of prudent 
judgment into the Constitution where it can't be tam-
pered with. 
Taxpayers and retirees alike have a big stake in the 
efficient management of the state pension funds. 
Your "yes" vote on Proposition 21 will give fund manag-
ers realistic tools to keep benefits up and costs down. 
WUIS J. PAPAN 
Member of the Assembly. 19th District 
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